Tunagate

Background

Star-Kist Canada Inc. was a Canadian tuna cannery that operated in Bayside, New Brunswick, near the town of Saint Andrews. In 1985, it was the principal industry of Charlotte County, employing more than 400 people. The company sold tuna under several of its own brand names and packed tuna for a dozen other companies. The Saint Andrews cannery was Canada’s only tuna cannery. A subsidiary of the H.J. Heinz company of Pittsburgh, it was responsible for between 40 and 50 per cent of all tuna sold in Canada at the time. Most of the tuna processed at the plant was caught off the coast of West Africa, or even from as far away as East Asia. At the time, the company was generally considered to be reputable, selling a high-quality product.

Beginning in 1983, federal government food inspectors began rejecting more and more batches of canned tuna because they didn’t meet federal standards. Random sampling found tuna that was rancid and decomposed, which in turn was classified as unfit for human consumption. Star-Kist countered that the inspectors were being “arbitrary and capricious.” By November 1984, more than $300,000 worth of canned tuna had piled up in the Star-Kist warehouse.

Federal fisheries minister, John Fraser, toured the plant in 1984. He sampled tuna that plant managers said was rejected by federal inspectors. Fraser later told journalist Eric Malling, in an interview with the CBC’s The Fifth Estate, that he was not previously aware of the rejected tuna, and that two of the three tins he tasted “seemed pretty good.”

Scandal

Federal inspectors were first tasked with ensuring the tuna was safe to eat, and then with determining whether the tuna met Canadian standards for “fitness to eat.” In other words, whether it looked, smelled and tasted good. Star-Kist argued that if the tuna was deemed safe to eat, it should be sold. Fish inspectors argued that tuna deemed safe to eat could still be rancid or decomposing, a result of being stored or transported at the wrong temperature, and thus not considered “fit for human consumption.”

Star-Kist attacked the government’s standards, arguing they were too vague or too subjective. The government countered that the problem may simply be where Star-Kist was procuring some of its fish. It was noted that even if 80 per cent of the batches that failed inspections were thrown out, only about 2 or 3 per cent of Star-Kist’s yearly total output was being rejected.

Star-Kist appealed the government’s decision, lost, and then complained that the system seemed rigged against them. The company then argued that consumers should be the ones deciding what constituted “fit for human consumption,” making their decisions known by whether they purchased the product. Finally, Star-Kist threatened to embarrass the government for their alleged overreach by closing the plant.

By this point, Star-Kist’s president was complaining that his warehouse had over half a million dollars’ worth of rejected tuna. Some of it was used to make cat food, though the company offered most of it to the federal government for famine relief efforts in Ethiopia. The government rejected the offer.

Star-Kist then began a political campaign to exert pressure on fisheries minister John Fraser. New Brunswick premier Richard Hatfield proposed that a New Brunswick crown corporation would inspect the tuna and assess it once more, and paid it $35,000 to do so. However, this came with a caveat — the goal was to save the plant and the jobs. Hatfield then relayed Star-Kist’s concerns and demands to Fraser. Ultimately, the company wanted assurances their tuna would be released to consumers, and that the government would then change its food inspection procedures. Fraser also started his own investigation. He hired experts from four different provinces, all of whom supported the initial determination made by the federal inspectors.

By the spring of 1985, there were four investigations into the tuna. Three of them reported to Fraser and all of them concluded the fish wasn’t fit for human consumption. But the New Brunswick assessment found in favour of the company, and Fraser agreed with their conclusion. In April 1985, Fraser ordered nearly 1 million cans of tuna, valued at between $600,000 and $800,000, to be released from the warehouse.

Aftermath and Consequences

At the conclusion of The Fifth Estate segment, fisheries minister John Fraser was incredulous. He argued that neither he nor Richard Hatfield had done anything wrong, and that they had instead tried to help. Fraser rejected claims that his decision to release the tainted tuna was political interference.

Fraser resigned six days after The Fifth Estate segment aired on 17 September 1985. The Mulroney government had to issue a recall of the tuna. What Mulroney knew of the scandal, and when, was the subject of considerable debate. Fraser had alleged Mulroney, or his office, had known of his decision, but this was later denied.

The Star-Kist plant laid off its 400 workers in late September 1985. The plant re-opened in August 1988, then closed for good in 1990. Star-Kist never regained its market share after the tainted tuna scandal.

John Fraser resigned from his job as fisheries minister. He was then appointed Speaker of the House of Commons, a position he held from 1986 until January 1994.

Eric Malling won an award for his reporting on the scandal, which cemented his position as one of Canada’s leading investigative journalists.

New government regulations were introduced in March 1986 that prevented government ministers from interfering in the work of federal food inspectors.

Tunagate Game

A card game based on the scandal was invented by two British Columbian entrepreneurs and marketed around the 1985 holiday season. Sheila Copps, one of a handful of Liberal MPs who were known as the “rat pack” for constantly antagonizing the Mulroney government, sold the game through her office. The aim of the game was for players — called ministers — to avoid taking responsibility for the tainted tuna scandal. The game came in a container that resembled a tin of tuna.